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BRIEF

# 161 75

**Secret**

1. MOSCOW HAS FINALLY RESPONDED TO THE ANTI-SOVIET SPEECH VICE PREMIER CHEN HSI-LIEN MADE TWO WEEKS AGO AT THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS OF THE SINKIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.Y

CHEN HAD CONGRATULATED SINKIANG FOR ITS PAST VICTORIES IN "SMASHING" SOVIET AGGRESSION AND SUBVERSION AND WARNED OF THE CONTINUING NEED TO MAINTAIN VIGILANCE AGAINST BOTH THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOVIET SURPRISE ATTACK AND SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO FOMENT DISSENSION AMONG THE MINORITIES. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME IN RECENT MONTHS THAT A RANKING CHINESE OFFICIAL HAD EXPLICITLY RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOVIET ATTACK ON CHINA.Y

PRAVDA ON OCTOBER 15 CARRIED AN ARTICLE LAMBASTING CHINA'S POLICIES ON MINORITIES--PARTICULARLY ITS SUPPRESSION OF MINORITY RELIGIONS--AND AGAIN REMINDING SOVIET READERS OF THE PHYSICAL THREAT CHINA POSES TO THE USSR. THE CHARGE THAT THE CHINESE ARE SUPPRESSING MINORITY RELIGIONS SUGGESTS THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT ONE REASON CHEN WENT TO SINKIANG WAS BECAUSE OF A RELIGIOUS PROBLEM THERE CAUSING TROUBLE FOR PEKING. PRAVDA'S IMPLICATION THAT

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CHINA POSES A THREAT TO THE USSR IS A LOGICAL COUNTER TO CHEN'S  
ANTI-SOVIET REMARKS.4

MOSCOW'S DELAY IN RESPONDING TO CHEN'S TRIP TO SINKIANG  
SUGGESTS THE SOVIETS AT FIRST WERE UNCERTAIN AS TO PRECISELY WHAT  
THE VISIT SIGNIFIED. CHEN WAS THE COMMANDER OF THE SHENYANG MILITARY  
REGION WHEN THE FIRST ARMED CLASHES TOOK PLACE ALONG THE SINO-SOVIET  
BORDER IN MARCH 1969. THE SOVIETS MAY INITIALLY HAVE FELT THAT THE  
TRIP TO SINKIANG--HIS FIRST PUBLICIZED VISIT TO A BORDER AREA SINCE HE  
MOVED TO PEKING IN 1974--WAS INTENDED AS A SIGNAL TO THEM OF A MORE  
AGGRESSIVE CHINESE POSTURE ALONG THE BORDER.4

THE SOVIETS LONG HAVE FELT THAT THE DANGER OF TROUBLE ALONG THE  
BORDER INCREASES PROPORTIONATELY WITH THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL TENSION  
IN PEKING. ON SEPTEMBER 21, A SOVIET CHINA-WATCHER, COMMENTING ON  
THE CURRENT "WATER MARGIN" CAMPAIGN IN CHINA, WARNED PUBLICLY  
OF THE NEED FOR VIGILANCE AND CAUTION BECAUSE IT WAS DURING TIMES OF  
INSTABILITY IN CHINA THAT THE MAOIST LEADERSHIP IN THE PAST HAD  
RESORTED TO "NEW ATTACKS AGAINST PEACE AND SECURITY." 25X1

2. ROMANIA: ROMANIAN PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU ABRUPTLY CANCELED

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HIS STATE VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA, SLATED TO BEGIN TUESDAY. NEITHER  
 BUCHAREST NOR BELGRADE HAS PUBLICLY COMMENTED ON THE CANCELLATION. 4

IN A STATEMENT THAT PROBABLY REFLECTS HIS OWN LACK OF INFORMATION  
 RATHER THAN THE FACTS, A YUGOSLAV DIPLOMAT IN BUCHAREST SAID ON  
 TUESDAY THAT BELGRADE IS "MYSTIFIED" BY THE ROMANIAN DECISION. THE  
 YUGOSLAV ADDED HE HAD BEEN TOLD TO ATTRIBUTE THE CANCELLATION TO  
 "TECHNICAL AND PROTOCOL REASONS." 4

CEAUSESCU IS SAID TO HAVE INSISTED THAT PRESIDENT TITO MEET HIM  
 AT THE AIRPORT, A UNIQUE COURTESY THAT THE YUGOSLAV LEADER HAS  
 EXTENDED TO PRESIDENT FORN. TITO REPORTEDLY REFUSED, DESPITE THE  
 ROMANIAN CONTENTION THAT CEAUSESCU IS TITO'S "CLOSET ALLY." 4

THE YUGOSLAV ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE TWO SIDES COULD NOT AGREE ON  
 A JOINT DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES PROPOSED BY THE ROMANIANS AND ON  
 TWO SUGGESTED ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENTS. MEANWHILE, THE BELGRADE  
 CORRESPONDENT FOR THE MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY REPORTS WELL-INFORMED  
 SOURCES AS SAYING THE VISIT IS NOT LIKELY TO BE RESCHEDULED SOON. 4

STRAINS IN THE RELATIONS BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE WITH MOSCOW ARE  
 MORE LIKELY TO HAVE CAUSED THE CANCELLATION THAN THE ALLEGED

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BILATERAL DIFFICULTIES. THE SOVIETS ARE UNDOUBTEDLY ANNOYED THAT BELGRADE AND BUCHAREST ARE WORKING TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH PEKING. THE ROMANIANS, WHO ARE THE MORE VULNERABLE TO SOVIET PRESSURE, PROBABLY DECIDED TO PLAY ~~IT~~ IT SAFE RATHER THAN RISK FURTHER FRICTION WITH THE KREMLIN.4

UNLIKE THE YUGOSLAVS, THE ROMANIANS, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET ALLIANCE SYSTEM, MAY HAVE FELT IT MORE PRUDENT NOT TO FLAUNT THEIR INCREASINGLY CLOSE TIES WITH NONALIGNED YUGOSLAVIA. MOREOVER, WITHIN THE MONTH THE ROMANIANS MUST CONSIDER HOW TO THWART SOVIET EFFORTS AT THE CEMA SUMMIT TO GAIN GREATER INTEGRATION ON NEW FIVE-YEAR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS.4

THE CANCELLATION MAY STEM DIRECTLY FROM TWO VISITS TO BUCHAREST EARLIER THIS MONTH--ONE BY SOVIET PARTY SECRETARY KATUSHEV, THE OTHER BY STANE DOLANC, TITO'S CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE FOR PARTY AFFAIRS. BOTH MEN MEET WITH ESSENTIALLY THE SAME HIGH-RANKING ROMANIANS, INCLUDING CEAUSESCU. THE LEVEL OF ROMANIAN PARTICIPATION AT THESE MEETINGS SUGGESTS THAT MAJOR ITEMS UNDER DISCUSSION INCLUDED DIFFERENCES WITH MOSCOW OVER THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES.

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THE CEMA SUMMIT, AND ROMANIAN-CHINESE RELATIONS.4

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] BUCHAREST'S GOOD RELATIONS WITH PEKING ARE BY FAR BUCHAREST'S CHIEF PROBLEM WITH MOSCOW. THE UNPRECEDENTEDLY LARGE NUMBER OF ROMANIAN OFFICIALS--INCLUDING PARTY, STATE, MILITARY, AND INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL--VISITING CHINA LAST MONTH HAS UNDOUBTEDLY ADDED TO SOVIET-ROMANIAN STRAINS.4

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THE DOLANC-CEAUSESCU DISCUSSIONS, WHICH RECEIVED PLAUDITS IN THE ROMANIAN PRESS, MAY HAVE SERVED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR A ROMANIAN-YUGOSLAVIA SUMMIT UNTIL BOTH SIDES FEEL CIRCUMSTANCES ARE MORE OPPORTUNE FOR CEAUSESCU-TITO MEETING. DOLANC, AS TITO'S CHIEF LIEUTENANT, IS EMINENTLY QUALIFIED TO DISCUSS MAJOR ISSUES IN BILATERAL RELATIONS. AT TITO'S BEHEST, DOLANC ALSO MET CEAUSESCU IN LATE JANUARY. NOW AS THEN, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF POLICY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BELGRADE AND BUCHAREST THAT WOULD ~~BE~~ BE SUFFICIENTLY PRONOUNCED TO HAVE CAUSED THE CANCELLATION OF CEAUSESCU'S TALKS WITH TITO. [REDACTED]

3. YUGOSLAVIA - PORTUGAL: FOREIGN MINISTER MINIC'S SUCCESSFUL

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TALKS IN LISBON THIS WEEK HAVE SET THE STAGE FOR PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES' SLATED VISIT TO BELGRADE FROM OCTOBER 24 TO 26.4

THE COMMUNIQUE, PERSONAL STATEMENTS, AND MEDIA COVERAGE DURING THE MINIC VISIT REFLECT SATISFACTION ON THE PART OF BOTH SIDES. MINIC MET WITH LEADERS OF VARIOUS POLITICAL PERSUASIONS, INCLUDING PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES, PRIME MINISTER PINEHEIRO DE AZEVEDO, FOREIGN MINISTER MELO ANTUNES, AND EVEN THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE POPULAR DEMOCRATS, SA CARREIRO--WHICH THE FAR-LEFT AND THE COMMUNISTS LABEL A FASCIST GROUP.4

BELGRADE'S PROMINENT ROLE IN THE THIRD WORLD, THE RELATIVELY HIGH DEGREE OF PERSONAL FREEDOMS ALLOWED IN SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA, AND TITO'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN A NONALIGNED FOREIGN POLICY OBVIOUSLY HAVE CONSIDERABLE APPEAL FOR A WIDE RANGE OF PORTUGUESE POLITICIANS AND INTELLECTUALS.4

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THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO SIGN IN THE "NEAR FUTURE" COOPERATION AGREEMENTS ON ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC, CULTURAL, AND TECHNICAL EXCHANGES. PLANS WERE NOT ONLY FIRMED UP FOR COSTA GOMES' VISIT, BUT MELO ANTUNES ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO VISIT BELGRADE AT A FUTURE, UNSPECIFIED DATE.

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4. USSR: A SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS IS SCHEDULED FOR NEXT FEBRUARY. IT WILL BE THE 25TH IN THE PARTY'S HISTORY AND THE THIRD PRESIDED OVER BY GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV. IT IS ALREADY BEGINNING TO OCCUPY THE ATTENTION OF PARTY FIGURES, HIGH AND LOW.

PARTY CONGRESSES HAVE VARIED GREATLY OVER THE YEARS IN CHARACTER AND IN SIGNIFICANCE.

THE 19TH CONGRESS IN 1952--THE LAST UNDER STALIN'S LEADERSHIP--LAID A GROUNDWORK FOR A GENERATIONAL CHANGE IN THE TOP LEADERS. THE GROUNDWORK DID NOT HOLD UP WHEN THE DICTATOR DIED SIX MONTHS LATER, AND HIS HEIRS WERE LEFT TO QUARREL OVER SOVIET POLICIES

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AND THEIR OWN HIERARCHICAL POSITIONS.4

THE 20TH CONGRESS IN 1956 LAUNCHED NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV'S DE-STALINIZATION CAMPAIGN; ITS IMPACT IS STILL BEING FELT THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT.4

THE 21ST CONGRESS IN 1959 SANK WITHOUT A RIPPLE. THE 22ND CONGRESS IN 1961, AMONG OTHER THINGS, APPROVED A VISIONARY PARTY PROGRAM, MAPPING OUT THE STAGES TOWARD COMMUNISM IN THE FOLLOWING DECADES.4

THE 23RD CONGRESS, IN 1966, CONSOLIDATED THE POSITION OF THE NEW TEAM AND SWEPT THE STALIN PROBLEM UNDER THE RUG, SETTLING FOR A NARROWLY LIMITED "REHABILITATION" OF THE MAN WHO HAD LED THE PARTY FOR NEARLY 30 YEARS.4

THE 24TH IN 1971 WAS KEYNOTED BY PLEDGES OF CONTINUITY.4

THE TWO CONGRESSES HELD THUS FAR UNDER THE CURRENT KREMLIN LEADERSHIP HAVE BEEN BUSINESSLIKE, AS

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PROMISED BY THE MEN WHO OUSTED KHRUSHCHEV FOR "HARE-  
BRAINED SCHEMES," AND THEREFORE RELATIVELY DRAB. Y

THE 25TH COULD WELL FOLLOW IN THIS PATTERN, BUT  
THERE WILL BE PRESSURES FOR CHANGE. EVEN IF THE <sup>IT</sup>  
<sup>PROMISES OF CONTINUITY</sup> WOULD BE FRAGILE, FOR ANOTHER  
25TH. SIMPLY OFFERS MORE OF THE SAME. GENERATIONS LOOMS  
IN THE KREMLIN. Y

THE AVERAGE AGE OF THE POLITBURO--THE PARTY'S  
STEERING COMMITTEE--IS 71, AND MORE THAN HALF OF <sup>ITS MEMBERS</sup> THEM  
WILL PROBABLY LEAVE THE SCENE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW  
YEARS. Y

THE GENERAL SECRETARY, AND HIS UNOFFICIAL DEPUTY,  
ANDREY KIRILENKO, ARE APPROACHING 70. MIKHAIL SUSLOV,  
THE PARTY IDEOLOGIST IS 72. PREMIER KOSYGIN IS 71.  
PRESIDENT PODGORNYY IS 72 AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE  
GRECHKO IS 71. Y

THESE FIVE SENIORS, ALONG WITH MINISTER OF FOR-  
EIGN AFFAIRS GROMYKO {66} AND KGB CHAIRMAN ANDROPOV  
{61} FUNCTION AS A SMALL <sup>J. IV</sup> ~~INNER~~ COLLECTIVE WITHIN THE

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POLITBURO. THERE IS LITTLE OR NO DEVOLUTION OF  
AUTHORITY TO THE JUNIORS ON THE POLITBURO.4

AMONG THE JUNIORS--A RELATIVE TERM AT BEST--ARE  
ABLE MEN ALREADY ON THE POLITBUOR, AS WELL AS OTHERS  
WAITING ON THE THRESHOLD. NONE OF THEM HAS ESTABLISHED  
A SPECIAL CLAIM TO CONSIDERATION AS A CONTENDER FOR  
A POSITION AT THE TOP.4

IF THE SOVIETS WISH TO ACHIEVE THE FIRST SMOOTH  
SUCCESSION IN THEIR HISTORY, SERIOUS COLLECTIVE PLAN-  
NING WILL HAVE TO BEGIN SOON. THERE IS NO SIGN OF  
SUCH PLANNING.4

BREZHNEV AND OTHERS HAVE SHOWN INTEREST IN GIV-  
ING THE 25TH CONGRESS--PROBABLY BREZHNEV'S LAST--A  
SPECIAL CHARACTER THAT WOULD PUT THEIR STAMP ON THE  
PARTY FUTURE.4

BREZHNEV, UNTIL THIS YEAR, WAS URGING THE AP-  
PROVAL OF A 15-YEAR ECONOMIC PLAN (1976-90). THE  
DRAFTING OF SUCH A PLAN WOULD PRESENT PLANNERS WITH

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HORRENDOUS TECHNICAL PROBLEMS AND ENGAGE THE TOP LEADERS IN POLITICAL CONTROVERSY. {THE IDEA MAY HAVE BEEN DROPPED; AT LEAST IT HAS BEEN MENTIONED PUBLICLY BY A SOVIET LEADER ONLY ONCE THIS YEAR, AND THAT ONE REFERENCE WAS CENSORED OUT OF PRAVDA.} 4

BREZHNEV IS ALSO ON THE PUBLIC RECORD WITH A PROMISE THAT A DRAFT OF A NEW CONSTITUTION WOULD BE PUBLISHED IN TIME FOR THE 25TH CONGRESS. 4

THE CONGRESS WILL BE ASKED TO APPROVE A NEW FIVE YEAR PLAN {1975-80}. IT MAY TAKE UP OTHER UNFINISHED BUSINESS LIKE THE PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF MANAGEMENT IN BOTH INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE. 4

EACH OF THESE MATTERS HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES, AND BUREAUCRATIC EMPIRES ARE AT STAKE. REACHING AGREEMENT IN THE POLITBURO WILL NOT BE EASY, AND BREZHNEV, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, WILL HAVE A BUSY FALL. [REDACTED] 25X1

5. BULGARIA: BULGARIAN PARTY AND STATE LEADER TODOR ZHIV-

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KOV WILL "SOON" MAKE HIS FIRST VISIT TO MOSCOW  
SINCE OCTOBER 1974, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN SOFIA  
HAS TOLD HIS YUGOSLAV COUNTERPART. 4

ZHIVKOV'S VISIT WILL AFFORD THE BULGARIAN  
LEADER THE OPPORTUNITY TO GET A FULL BRIEFING FROM  
THE SOVIETS ON A WIDE RANGE OF CURRENT PROBLEMS.  
ZHIVKOV HAS BEEN EAGER TO CHANGE BULGARIA'S RE-  
PUTATION AS THE MOST SYCOPHANTIC OF MOSCOW'S AL-  
LIES, AND HAS BEEN MAKING AN EFFORT TO FOSTER A  
MORE INTERNATIONAL IMAGE OF AN INDEPENDENT-MINDED  
BULGARIA. ZHIVKOV APPEARS WILLING TO TAKE A LEAD-  
ING ROLE IN ADVANCING "INTER-BALKAN" COOPERATION  
SCHEMES, BUT ONLY IF THEY AVOID THE SENSITIVE PO-  
LITICAL AREA. 4

//WITH SOVIET APPROVAL, ZHIVKOV HAS BEEN TRYING  
HARD TO PROMOTE BETTER US-BULGARIAN RELATIONS, PRI-  
MARILY FOR ECONOMIC REASONS.// IN CONNECTION WITH  
THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED SOVIET-BULGARIAN FIVE YEAR

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ECONOMIC PROTOCOL PLAN. SOVIET ECONOMIC PLANNING

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CHIEF BAYBAKOV ADMONISHED SOFIA TO DEPEND LESS ON

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THE USSR FOR ENERGY AND RAW MATERIAL NEEDS.

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1. USSR-SYRIA: THE USSR AND SYRIA MAY NOT BE SEEING EYE TO EYE ON MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS.4

SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM AND DEFENSE MINISTER TALAS, WHO HAD REMAINED BEHIND IN MOSCOW AFTER PRESIDENT ASAD'S RETURN TO SYRIA LATE LAST WEEK, LEFT MOSCOW ON WEDNESDAY. WHEN THEY DEPARTED, THE ANNOUNCEMENT DESCRIBED THEIR TALKS AS "FRIENDLY AND BUSINESSLIKE" AND "AN EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS."4

THIS LANGUAGE--ALONG WITH THE BREVITY OF THE COMMUNIQUE ON ASAD'S VISIT AND THE FAILURE OF EITHER SIDE TO PUBLICIZE THE TOASTS EXCHANGED BY GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV AND ASAD--SUGGESTS DIFFERENCES.4

THE SOVIETS ARE WARY OF ASAD'S INTENTIONS REGARDING NEW ISRAELI-SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT TALKS, SUSPECTING THAT HE WANTS THEIR SUPPORT ONLY TO IMPROVE HIS BARGAINING POSITION BEFORE EMBARKING ON BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. MOSCOW MAY HAVE SOUGHT STRONG ASSURANCES FROM ASAD THAT IT WOULD HAVE A MAJOR ROLE IN THE NEXT ROUND OF MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY.

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2. LEBANON: BEIRUT WAS QUIET ON THURSDAY, AND SOME BANKS AND SHOPS REOPENED. TRIPOLI AND ZAHLAH WERE ALSO CALM.4

THE UPSURGE OF FIGHTING EARLIER THIS WEEK IN THE EASTERN SUBURBS OF THE CAPITAL WAS CLEARLY TRACEABLE TO PHALANGISTS WHO FIRED INTO A REFUGEE CAMP. THE PHALANGIST ACTION, ON THE EVE OF THE ARAB LEAGUE FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE IN CAIRO, WAS PROBABLY INTENDED TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE.4

THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE ENDED WITHOUT ANY CONCRETE PROPOSALS TO END THE FIGHTING. THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE APPEALED FOR SELF-RESTRAINT AND URGED ARAB LEAGUE MEMBERS TO PROVIDE LEBANON WITH FINANCIAL AID. THE ABSENCE OF SYRIA AND THE PLO ELIMINATED ANY CHANCE THE CONFERENCE MIGHT HAVE HAD TO ACHIEVE SUBSTANTIAL RESULTS. LIBYA ALSO DID NOT ATTEND THE CONFERENCE, POSSIBLY FEARING THAT ITS SUPPORT FOR RADICAL ELEMENTS MIGHT BECOME A TOPIC FOR DISCUSSION.4

THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION OR DIALOGUE COMMITTEE HAS NOT MET FOR TWO DAYS, AND NO SCHEDULE HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED FOR ITS RESUMPTION. THE RECENTLY FORMED POLITICAL REFORM SUBCOMMITTEE DID MEET ON THURSDAY, WITH BOTH LEFTIST KAMAL JUMBLATT AND PHALANGIST LEADER

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PIERRE JUMAYYIL IN ATTENDANCE.4

THE PROSPECTS FOR ANY PROGRESS BY THE POLITICAL SUBCOMMITTEE, HOWEVER, DO NOT APPEAR GOOD. INTERIOR MINISTER SHAMUN, WHO IS NOT A MEMBER, IS SAID TO BE DISSATISFIED WITH THE GROUP'S COMPOSITION.

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3. MOROCCO: IN AN ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON THURSDAY, KING HASSAN PRESENTED ONLY THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE ADVISORY OPINION JUST RELEASED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ON THE STATUS OF SPANISH SAHARA.4

ACCORDING TO A PRESS SUMMARY OF THE SPEECH, HASSAN DECLARED THAT THE OPINION SHOWED MOROCCO'S HISTORIC LEGAL TIES WITH THE SAHARA. HE THEREBY IGNORED THE FACT THAT THE COURT NOTED THAT THESE TIES NEITHER ESTABLISHED TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY NOR PRECLUDED THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN SPANISH SAHARA. THE COURT'S FAILURE TO FIND PROOF OF MOROCCO'S CLAIM OF HISTORIC SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE AREA WILL GIVE RABAT SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN FORTHCOMING UN DEBATES.4

HASSAN, STATING THAT MOROCCANS MUST JOIN THEIR KINSMEN,

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ANNOUNCED HE WILL ORGANIZE A PEACEFUL MASS MARCH BY 350,000 UNARMED MOROCCANS INTO SPANISH SAHARA. HE DID NOT INDICATE WHEN THE MARCH WOULD START, BUT OFFICIALS ARE BEGINNING TO RECRUIT VOLUNTEERS. IN A ROUSING APPEAL FOR NATIONAL SUPPORT, THE KING SAID HE WOULD BE THE FIRST VOLUNTEER AND WOULD THUS BE ABLE TO LEAVE A "TRUE CROWN OF PATRIOTISM" TO POSTERITY.4

THE KING DECLARED THAT MOROCCO COULD NOT SEEK THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT AND THE UN WHILE AT THE SAME TIME "TAKING THE ROAD TO BLOODSHED." HE STRESSED THAT MOROCCO WAS NOT DECLARING WAR ON SPAIN OR SEEKING A FIGHT WITH SPANISH FORCES, AND HE URGED MADRID NOT TO USE FORCE AGAINST UNARMED DEMONSTRATORS. IN AN APPARENT REFERENCE TO ALGERIA, HOWEVER, HASSAN WARNED THAT MOROCCANS WILL DEFEND THEMSELVES IN ANY ENCOUNTER WITH NON-SPANISH FORCES.4

SPAIN HAS NOT AS YET REACTED TO THE KING'S SPEECH, PREFERRING TO KEY ITS RESPONSE TO HOW THE MARCH DEVELOPS. IT WILL TRY TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION AS LONG AS THE DEMONSTRATORS REMAIN PEACEFUL. MADRID ALMOST CERTAINLY ASSUMES THAT SOME MOROCCAN SOLDIERS ARE BEING INFILTRATED IN THE GUISE OF CIVILIANS, AND IT MAY THEREFORE ALLOW

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ONLY A SMALL REPRESENTATION FAR BEYOND THE MOROCCAN BORDER. [REDACTED]

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4. ETHIOPIA: IN THE FACE OF MOUNTING UNREST, THE RULING MILITARY COUNCIL HAS IN RECENT WEEKS INCREASINGLY RESORTED TO REPRESSION AGAINST ITS OPPONENTS AND SUSPECTED DISSIDENTS.4

THE COUNCIL HAS CARRIED OUT WIDESPREAD ARRESTS THROUGHOUT ETHIOPIA SINCE DECLARING A STATE OF EMERGENCY IN ADDIS ABABA LAST MONTH IN AN ATTEMPT TO PUT AN END TO A STRIKE BY WORKERS PROTESTING THE COUNCIL'S POLICIES. THE PROCLAMATION SUSPENDED MOST CIVIL RIGHTS AND GAVE THE SECURITY FORCES ALMOST UNLIMITED POWERS OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO SHOOT ANYONE VIOLATING THE BAN ON STRIKES. SECURITY FORCES HAVE ENCOUNTERED SOME ARMED RESISTANCE DURING THE ARREST PROCESS.4

WORKERS CONSIDERED TO BE INSTIGATORS OF THE STRIKE HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AND BEATEN, AND SOME REPORTEDLY SHOT. THE AUTHORITIES HAVE CONCENTRATED PARTICULAR ATTENTION ON ROUNDING UP LEADERS OF THE CONFEDERATION OF ETHIOPIAN LABOR UNIONS, THE COUNTRY'S CENTRAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, WHO SIGNED AN ANTI-COUNCIL RESOLUTION IN

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SEPTEMBER.4

ONLY A FEW OF THE OTHER PERSONS ARRESTED ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN ACTUAL CRIMINAL ACTS—SUCH AS THE BOMBING LAST WEEK OF THE ADDIS ABABA TELECOMMUNICATIONS STATION. MOST ARE VAGUELY SUSPECTED OF BEING DISLOYAL TO THE COUNCIL OR OF HAVING PARTICIPATED IN THE SHORT-LIVED STRIKE.4

IN ERITREA PROVINCE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS INTENSIFIED ITS USE OF HARSH AND INDISCRIMINATE MEASURES AGAINST THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN RETALIATION FOR ASSASSINATIONS BY INSURGENTS. ON OCTOBER 12, AN ARMY OFFICER AND TWO BANK OFFICIALS WERE KILLED IN ASMARA, REPORTEDLY BY REBEL ASSASSINS. RADIO ASMARA SHORTLY AFTERWARD BROADCAST A WARNING THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO TAKE WHATEVER STEPS WERE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ETHIOPIA, EVEN IF IT MEANT THE SLAUGHTER OF ALL ERITREANS WHO SUPPORT THE REBELS. THE BROADCAST ALSO INCITED SECURITY FORCES TO RETALIATE FOR THE REBEL ASSASSINATIONS.4

MEMBERS OF THE "JOINT COMMAND," A GOVERNMENT TERRORIST FORCE WHICH OPERATES IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES, SOON AFTERWARD BEGAN

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TO KILL ASMARA RESIDENTS AT RANDOM. MEMBERS OF THE FORCE BURST INTO THREE CROWDED BARS AND OPENED FIRE WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS. THERE WERE ALSO SCATTERED EXECUTIONS OF INDIVIDUALS. TOTAL CASUALTIES THAT AFTERNOON REPORTEDLY WERE 31 KILLED AND 40 WOUNDED. THE "JOINT COMMAND" IS ALSO BELIEVED RESPONSIBLE FOR NUMEROUS OTHER ARBITRARY KILLINGS DURING RECENT MONTHS.4

SECURITY FORCES HAVE ALSO ARRESTED A LARGE NUMBER OF PERSONS IN ASMARA IN RECENT WEEKS. LIKE MOST OF THE DETENTIONS IN ADDIS ABABA, THE ARRESTS LARGELY APPEAR TO BE ARBITRARY AND DESIGNED TO INTIMIDATE THE LOCAL POPULATION.4

THE GOVERNMENT'S BLUNT ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS INTENTION TO TAKE STRONG ACTION AGAINST ERITREAN CIVILIANS, BESIDES GIVING OFFICIAL APPROVAL TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE JOINT COMMAND, WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY ENCOURAGE UNDISCIPLINED TROOPS TO CONTINUE HARASSING CIVILIANS. GOVERNMENT SOLDIERS HAVE FREQUENTLY TAKEN REVENGE ON VILLAGERS AFTER SUFFERING A SETBACK AT THE HANDS OF THE REBELS.

THE GOVERNMENT IS ATTEMPTING TO DENY FOOD TO THE ERITREAN REBELS BY MAKING AVAILABLE ONLY MARGINAL AMOUNTS THROUGH

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RATIONING AND RIGID DISTRIBUTION CONTROLS. THESE MEASURES HAVE CREATED A CRITICAL FOOD SITUATION IN THE PROVINCE. THE GOVERNMENT IN JUNE SUSPENDED THE DISTRIBUTION OF RELIEF SUPPLIES TO VILLAGERS DISLOCATED BY THE FIGHTING.4

ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCEMENTS, THE SECURITY FORCES SINCE OCTOBER 1 HAVE KILLED AT LEAST 83 PERSONS AND ARRESTED NUMEROUS OTHERS FOR PARTICIPATING IN REBELLIONS IN OTHER PROVINCES. THE GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, STILL FACES A CRITICAL SECURITY SITUATION IN SEVERAL PROVINCES BECAUSE OF CONTINUING INSURRECTIONS.4

THE COUNCIL'S REPRESSIVE MEASURES HAVE ALIENATED INFLUENTIAL SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION. THE DISAFFECTION OF STUDENTS, LEFTISTS, AND INTELLECTUALS—TOGETHER WITH THE LACK OF SUPPORT FROM ETHIOPIA'S TRADITIONAL, CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS—LEAVES THE COUNCIL ALMOST SOLELY DEPENDENT ON THE ARMED FORCES FOR ITS SURVIVAL. THERE IS ALREADY SERIOUS UNHAPPINESS WITH THE COUNCIL WITHIN THE MILITARY, AND A GROWING AWARENESS THAT THE USE OF THE SECURITY FORCES AGAINST THE VARIOUS INSURRECTIONS IS DRAINING ETHIOPIA'S FINANCIAL RESOURCES

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AND WEAKENING ITS DEFENSE AGAINST EXTERNAL THREATS. A CONTINUATION  
OF THE COUNCIL'S DIVISIVE POLICIES SEEMS LIKELY EVENTUALLY TO  
AROUSE A MORE ORGANIZED AND ACTIVE MILITARY OPPOSITION.

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**1. LAOS: THE CELEBRATIONS COMMEMORATING THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY**

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OF THE LAO INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT DEMONSTRATED THAT PRIME MINISTER SOUVANNA PHOUMA NO LONGER HAS A MEANINGFUL ROLE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF LAOS.4

THE COMMUNISTS HUSTLED SOUVANNA--A FOUNDING MEMBER OF THE ORIGINAL LAO INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT IN 1945--OUT OF VIENTIANE TO LUANG PRABANG TO PREVENT HIM FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE MASS CELEBRATION IN VIENTIANE. HIS ONLY PART IN THE FESTIVAL WAS A SHORT RADIO ADDRESS READ BY AN ANNOUNCER THAT REVIEWED, IN A DISJOINTED FASHION, THE COMMUNISTS' "30-YEAR LIBERATION STRUGGLE."4

PATHET LAO LEADERS WILL PROBABLY MAKE SURE THAT SOUVANNA SPENDS MOST OF HIS TIME IN LUANG PRABANG UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR NEXT APRIL, WHEN HE WILL FORMALLY RETIRE. PREPARATIONS FOR THESE ELECTIONS, WHICH WILL RATIFY THE COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER AND END THE FACADE OF A COALITION, ARE WELL UNDER WAY.4

INDEPENDENCE DAY SPEECHES AND COMMENTARIES IN THE PATHET LAO MEDIA EMPHASIZED THAT THE COMMUNIST PARTY--THE LAO PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY--WILL NOW GOVERN LAOS. ALTHOUGH KAYSONE PHOMVIHAN WAS NOT EXPLICITLY IDENTIFIED AS THE TOP MAN IN THE PARTY, THE FACT

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THAT HE DELIVERED THE KEYNOTE ADDRESS IN SAM NEUA IS A CLEAR INDICATION THAT HE OCCUPIES THE SENIOR POSITION.4

//IN HIS SPEECH, KAYSONE SAID THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE WILLING TO MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON IF THE US RESPECTS THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF LAOS, DOES NOT INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF LAOS, CEASES SUPPORT FOR THE LAO RIGHTISTS, AND KEEPS ITS PROMISE TO "HELP HEAL THE WOUNDS OF WAR"--A CATCH PHRASE FOR NEW AID.//4

//THE INCLUSION OF THE AID PROVISION GIVES THE COMMUNISTS A PRETEXT FOR BREAKING RELATIONS OR FOR FURTHER HARASSING THE EMBASSY IN VIENTIANE AT ANY TIME.

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3. THAILAND: KHUKRIT PRAMOT'S COALITION GOVERNMENT OVERCAME A SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL HURDLE LAST WEEK WITH THE PASSAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET BILL IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. WHEN HE TOOK OFFICE SIX MONTHS AGO, THE PRIME MINISTER DID NOT GIVE HIS SHAKY SEVEN-PARTY COALITION MUCH OF A CHANCE OF SURVIVING SUCH A TEST.4


KHUKRIT HAS NOW TURNED HIS ATTENTION TO CONSOLIDATING HIS CONTROL OVER THE RULING COALITION. A RESHUFFLING OF THE CABINET IS CLEARLY

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IN THE WORKS, AND KHUKRIT MAY ALSO ATTEMPT A REALIGNMENT OF THE  
COALITION.



KHUKRIT'S MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEM AT THE MOMENT IS WHETHER  
TO KEEP PRAMAN ADIREKSAN, HIS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER  
OF DEFENSE, IN THE COALITION. IN RECENT WEEKS, PRAMAN HAS EMERGED  
AS A MAN WHO WILL USE HIS DEFENSE POST TO BUILD A POLITICAL FOLLOWING  
IN THE ARMY. THE LONGER PRAMAN STAYS IN SUCH A KEY POST, THE STRONGER  
HIS POLITICAL BASE WILL BECOME AND THE GREATER HIS ABILITY TO  
CHALLENGE KHUKRIT FOR THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP. KHUKRIT MAY BE PRE-  
PARED TO DROP PRAMAN FROM THE CABINET IF HE CAN GAIN THE SUPPORT OF  
AT LEAST TWO ADDITIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES IN PUTTING TOGETHER A NEW  
COALITION.

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1. THAILAND-LAOS: INCIDENTS BETWEEN THAI AND LAO FORCES ALONG

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THEIR MUTUAL BORDER HAVE INCREASED IN THE PAST WEEK AND COULD LEAD TO MORE SERIOUS CLASHES.4

LAO TROOPS RECENTLY HAVE FIRED ON SEVERAL THAI RIVER PATROL CRAFT, AND LAO PATROL CRAFT HAVE FIRED INTO THAI POSITIONS ASHORE. CLASHES BETWEEN FORCES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE SPREAD ALONG THE ENTIRE MEKONG RIVER BOUNDARY.4

ROYAL THAI AIRCRAFT ARE NOW FLYING ARMED ESCORT MISSIONS FOR THE RIVER CRAFT. 25X1

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THUS FAR THE BORDER CLASHES HAVE NOT BEEN SERIOUS ENOUGH TO WARRANT LARGE-SCALE RETALIATION BY EITHER SIDE. BANGKOK IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO REPLY TO FURTHER INCIDENTS WITH A SHOW OF FORCE.

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**ARGENTINA: ARGENTINE PRESIDENT MARIA ESTELA PERON HAS RESUMED OFFICE, IN THE FACE OF OPPOSITION FROM SEVERAL POWERFUL GROUPS, AND LEFTIST TERRORIST GROUPS HAVE ALREADY THREATENED SERIOUS VIOLENCE DURING THE PERONIST RALLY ON OCTOBER 17 AT WHICH PERON WILL SPEAK. RUMORS SUGGEST THAT US CITIZENS WILL BE AMONG THE LEFTIST TARGETS.**

**THE FORCES ARRAYED AGAINST PERON COULD HAVE PREVENTED HER RETURN. THEY CHOSE NOT TO ON GROUNDS THAT SHE IS THE LEGITIMATE PRESIDENT AND MOST ARGENTINES STILL PREFER A CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION.**

**THESE SENTIMENTS, THOUGH STEADILY LOSING FORCE, WERE STRONG ENOUGH TO CONVINCE MILITARY LEADERS TO GIVE UP THEIR EFFORTS TO KEEP PERON AWAY FROM BUENOS AIRES. THEY HAVE ONCE AGAIN DECIDED TO STAND ASIDE AND ALLOW HER GOVERNMENT TO FALL VICTIM TO ITS OWN INCOMPETENCE. THEY EXPECT PUBLIC DISENCHANTMENT TO CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION WOULD BE PALATABLE.**

**MANY MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROAD POLITICAL AND UNION LEADERS HAD JOINED THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND IN URGING THE PRESIDENT TO EXTEND HER LEAVE OF ABSENCE. THEY BELIEVED THAT THE TEAM OF LUDER, ROSLEDO,**

AND CAPIERO, WHO GOVERNED WHILE SHE WAS AWAY, WAS MAKING CREDITABLE PROGRESS IN THE KEY AREAS OF THE ECONOMY AND IN COUNTERING TERRORISM. 4

OTHER PERONISTS--PARTICULARLY CONSERVATIVE LABOR BOSSES WHO HAVE STAKED THEIR POLITICAL FUTURE ON HER RETENTION OF THE PRESIDENCY--URGED HER TO RETURN. THEIR SUPPORT REINFORCED PERON'S STUBBORN DETERMINATION TO SOLDIER ON DESPITE THE PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL TOLL OF THE JOB. 4

PERON'S ACCEPTANCE OF A ROLE AS CEREMONIAL HEAD-OF-STATE MAY BE CENTRAL TO HER SURVIVAL. IF SHE NOW ALLOWS ROBLEDO AND CAPIERO A FREE HAND, HER GOVERNMENT COULD LINGER ALONG FOR SEVERAL MORE MONTHS, WITH THE MILITARY ON THE SIDELINES. IF SHE INSISTS ON TRYING TO RULE, THE BEST SHE CAN EXPECT WILL BE ANOTHER PERIOD OF ENFORCED REST AWAY FROM THE CAPITAL. 4

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CAPIERO'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM IS ALSO A KEY TO HER SURVIVAL. HE

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

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HAS ACQUIRED SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND ADOPTED REASONABLE, GRADUAL MEASURES THAT MAY BRAKE THE INFLATION IF HE CAN FEND OFF LARGE WAGE INCREASES.



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